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1 Introduction
National governments often subsidize the investment undertaken by domestic rms that compete on in-
ternational markets. While there is now a substantial literature concerned with nationally optimal policy
towards investment in both open and closed economies, the e¤ects of such policies on countries trading
partners have received much less attention. This is surprising for at least two reasons. On the one hand,
investment subsidies can be used as a strategic trade policy instrument and so might be expected to have
a beggar-thy-neighbour aspect. On the other hand, when the investment is in R&D, it typically generates
spillovers that can benet rms in other countries. As a result, R&D subsidies may be expected to increase
the positive externality. In this paper we are concerned with how the welfare of a group of countries is
a¤ected by national subsidies to investment, whether in the form of capital, capacity or R&D. In particular
we ask whether there is a case for limiting such subsidies.
These issues are timely since there is a growing policy consensus that direct state aid in the form of
production or export subsidies is undesirable, but that investment subsidies are much more benign. In
the European Union, for example, moves are under way to change the balance of assistance. In a 2005
consultation document on reform of state aid by European governments, sub-titled Less and Better Targeted
State Aid, the European Commission proposes a shift away from subsidies to production or xed costs
towards more targeted assistance, with a particular emphasis on R&D subsidies.1
The pros and cons of investment subsidies are related to but distinct from those of export or production
subsidies. It is now well understood that in oligopolistic markets national governments may face unilateral
incentives to subsidize exports or production, and that such subsidization typically leads to a prisoners
dilemma, where each country would gain if their policy independence were curtailed.2 However, as is also
well-known, the prediction that national governments will want to o¤er export or production subsidies is not
very robust. By contrast, the literature on strategic trade and industrial policy has shown that the case for
investment subsidies is much more robust, from the perspective of an individual country. When an export
subsidy is unavailable, an investment subsidy is typically nationally optimal when a domestic oligopolist faces
foreign rivals, and industrial policy can be used by a national government to help its rm capture a larger
share of the rents in imperfectly competitive markets. This has been shown by Spencer and Brander (1983),
Bagwell and Staiger (1994), Maggi (1996) and Neary and Leahy (2000) in a variety of special models, while
Leahy and Neary (2001) show that the result is robust for a wide class of models.3 An export subsidy would
1The ongoing debate at European level is documented at:
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/state_aid/reform/reform.html
2Brander and Spencer (1985) is a classic early statement of this result. Extensions and explorations of the robustness of the
result have generated a large literature which is reviewed in Brander (1995).
3Spencer and Brander (1983) were the rst to consider this issue, in a model where rms rst invest in R&D and than engage
in Cournot competition. Bagwell and Staiger (1994) considered the case of Bertrand competition with linear demands. Maggi
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be a more direct way to capture market share and when it is also available it takes over the rent-shifting
role. However, direct export subsidies are banned under the WTO, though persisting in more surreptitious
forms, whereas no similar ban applies to investment subsidies.
Given that all governments have an incentive to use rent-shifting investment subsidies, such subsidy wars
among exporters can result in a prisoners dilemma. In that case, all the exporting countries would be better
o¤ if they agreed to ban investment subsidies outright. However, from a global rst-best perspective that
includes the welfare of consumers, the oligopolistic distortion implies that output is below the Pareto e¢ cient
level. Higher output due to subsidization would be benecial in that it would help to undo this oligopoly
distortion. Another type of distortion arises because, when rms compete strategically, investment is not
chosen at the socially e¢ cient level. Whether the industrial policy chosen by national governments helps to
mitigate or exacerbate this particular distortion depends to a great extent on the level of spillovers. Thus
the welfare e¤ects of international industrial policy games for a group of countries or for the world as a whole
are quite complex and justify careful analysis.
We consider three di¤erent policy regimes in this paper. Our main concern is to compare the regime
in which governments use investment subsidies to that in which they do not intervene. In particular, we
ask whether the welfare of the group of countries would be improved if they committed to ban subsidies
altogether. To answer the latter question we compare union welfare in the investment subsidy game to that
in the non-intervention regime. Given the subsidies chosen by its trading partners, a government restricted
to using an investment subsidy can only attain the National Second Best.
If subsidies to production as well as investment were permitted, then a natural benchmark against which
to compare the investment subsidy and laissez-faire regimes would be the Global First Best, in which
investment is chosen at the e¢ cient level and price is set equal to marginal cost. However, as already noted,
direct production subsidies are typically banned by international agreements. An alternative and more plau-
sible benchmark is the cooperative optimum dened as the highest joint welfare that can be obtained
without a production subsidy. This would be attained if the national governments were to cooperate in
subordinating their policy discretion to a supra-national body (such as the European Commission). It repre-
sents a second-best for the group of countries, subject to the constraint that the product-market distortions
cannot be o¤set directly by subsidies.
The issue of state aid to industry by a group of countries has been considered in relatively few papers.
Besley and Seabright (1999) argue that all such aids are welfare-reducing, but Collie (2000, 2002) notes
(1996) considered an extension of the model of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) in which second-period competition is in prices,
but the outcome of the full game may resemble that of either a Cournot or a Bertrand one-period game depending on the value
of a cost parameter which represents the cost penalty of producing above capacity. He showed that the optimal investment
subsidy is positive irrespective of the value of the cost parameter. Neary and Leahy (2000) provide a general framework for this
literature, stressing the second-best nature of the case where an export subsidy is unavailable.
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that they may serve to o¤set oligopolistic under-production in the absence of an active multilateral anti-
trust policy. He considers a model of an economic union, and provides an explanation for the desire of
individual national governments to give unilateral production subsidies and the desire of the supra-national
union authority to limit them. Collie (2005) and Haaland and Kind (2005, 2006) consider similar issues in
the context of R&D subsidies, though only in relatively special models.4 In this paper we seek to compare
the welfare e¤ects of di¤erent policies in a general model which encompasses most of those in the literature.
Our framework can be thought of as a multilateral generalization of Neary and Leahy (2000). That paper
considered the case in which only the home government is policy active and did not provide general welfare
conclusions. It is only possible to compare such asymmetric equilibria when special functional forms are
imposed. By focusing instead on symmetric equilibria we are able to generalize greatly in other directions,
allowing general functional forms and also encompassing both quantity and price competition.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The general multi-country multi-rm model is presented in Section
2 and government behaviour is introduced in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 derive the main results for the
cases where the welfare weight attached to domestic consumption is zero or positive respectively. Section 6
considers in more detail the linear-quadratic special case with Cournot competition, and Section 7 shows that
similar results hold under Bertrand competition. Finally, Section 8 concludes with a summary of results.
2 Firm Behaviour
We consider a symmetric oligopolistic industry with n identical rms, each of which is located in one of
n countries, and sells on a single integrated market with no tari¤s or transport costs. The game proceeds
in three stages. In the rst stage, subsidies are set either by national governments or by a supra-national
authority, in a manner to be considered in later sections. In the remaining stages, the rms compete
simultaneously. In the second stage each rm chooses its investment expenditure ki, and in the third stage
it chooses a market action Ai, which may be either output or price.
Each rms total prots, denoted by i, consists of its operating prots, i, less investment costs  , plus
investment subsidy revenue siki. Operating prots in turn equal sales revenue less production costs, but we
do not need to make these components explicit in the general model. Hence prots can be written as follows:
i
 
k;A; si
  i (k;A)     ki+ siki (1)
4Collie (2000) considers production subsidies in a model of homogeneous product Cournot competition with general demands
but no R&D. Collie (2002) considers production subsidies in both Cournot and Bertrand competition with di¤erentiated goods
and linear demands. Collie (2005) allows for R&D and considers R&D subsidies in a model of Cournot competition with linear
demands. Haaland and Kind (2006 and 2007), written independently of this paper, consider similar issues assuming Cournot
duopoly, linear demands, and di¤erentiated products.
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where k =

k1 ... ki ... kn
0
is the vector of all rms investment levels and A =

A1 ... Ai ... An
0
is
the vector of all rmsmarket actions. This specication of the prot function is extremely general. The
investment carried out by a rm could be in capital or in process R&D, in which case it leads to a reduction in
its own production costs. It could also be in marketing or product quality, which shifts the demand function
it faces. In addition the investment spending of each rm may a¤ect the prots of all others because of R&D
or other spillovers. As for the nal stage, competition may be either Cournot or Bertrand.
As is natural in these models, we conne attention to subgame-perfect equilibria, and so the model must
be solved backwards. The third-stage rst-order condition for a typical rm is:
@i (k;A)
@Ai
= 0 (2)
We assume that there is a unique equilibrium of the third-stage game. Hence these rst-order conditions
for all n rms can be combined and solved to give the market actions as a function of the investment levels:
A (k).
In the second stage, each rm chooses its optimal level of investment anticipating the e¤ects of its choice
on the third-stage actions. To account for this, it proves very convenient to introduce a reduced form
operating prot function which depends directly only on investment levels as follows:
^i (k)  i [k;A (k)] (3)
Similarly we can write a reduced-form function for total prots:
^i
 
k; si
  ^i (k)     ki+ siki (4)
Hence the rms optimal choice of investment in the second stage implies the following condition:
@^i
@ki
= ^ii    0 + si = 0 (5)
This shows that rms will invest up to the point where the marginal return ^ii equals the net marginal cost
of investment  0  si. For later use, it is convenient to write this marginal return in terms of two parameters
(not necessarily constant of course),  and , dened implicitly as follows:
@i
@ki
= xi and ^ii =
@i
@ki
+
nX
j=1
@i
@Aj
dAj
dki
= xi (6)
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Here  is the marginal return to investment per unit output at given values of A, while  is one plus the
strategic component of the marginal return to investment when rms anticipate the e¤ects of their actions
on rivalsAj ; hence  is the ratio of the full e¤ect to the partial e¤ect:  = ^ii=
@i
@ki . A value for  of unity
is the non-strategic benchmark, so, following Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), we can say that rms engage in
strategic over-investment when  is greater than one, and conversely.
3 Global and National Welfare
Consider next the choice of investment subsidy in the rst stage of the game. This raises two issues: the
specication of national welfare and the nature of the policy regime. We consider these in turn.
We assume that national welfare is a weighted sum of domestic consumer surplus and prots net of
subsidy payments:
W i (k;A)  Bi (k;A) + i  k;A; si  siki (7)
where  is the weight attached to consumer surplus Bi. A value of  equal to zero corresponds to either
the case where all output from home rms is exported outside the union; or the case where there is some
domestic consumption but governments attach no value to it because they have been fully captured by
producer interests. Note also that we write consumer surplus as a function of k as well as of A, since this
allows for a direct e¤ect of investment on consumer welfare, for example through expenditure on marketing
or quality improvement. Making use of (1) to eliminate total prots from (7) yields:
W i (k;A) = Bi (k;A) + i (k;A)     ki (8)
so welfare depends directly only on k and A, since it is independent of the subsidy.
Turning to our assumptions about policy, we consider three di¤erent regimes, which we call Laissez-Faire
(L), Non-Cooperative Intervention (N ) and Cooperative Intervention (C ) respectively. The laissez-faire
equilibrium arises when all subsidies si are zero, and can be thought of as arising from a commitment to
non-intervention on the part of the n countries governments. In the non-cooperative intervention case,
countries play a Nash game in subsidies, each seeking to maximize national welfare as given by (8). Finally,
the cooperative equilibrium occurs when a supra-national authority chooses a uniform subsidy to maximize
the countriesaggregate welfare, which is simply the sum of their individual welfare levels:
W (k;A) =
nP
i
W i (k;A) (9)
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The equilibrium in the laissez-faire regime is given by the rst-order conditions for investment in (5) for all
rms, with the subsidies si equal to zero. In particular, it can be characterized by a value for the marginal
return to investment equal to . To derive the equilibria in the two policy-active regimes we must turn
next to the optimal choice of subsidies.
4 Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Prot-Shifting
We begin by focusing in this section on the pure prot-shifting case where consumption of the good is not
valued, so  = 0. Given this, we need to consider separately the cases of non-cooperative and cooperative
intervention. In the non-cooperative case, the government of country i chooses its subsidy to maximize
its own welfare only. Anticipating the choice of investment levels and market actions by all rms in the
second and third stages, it therefore seeks to maximize a reduced-form welfare function, analogous to the
reduced-form prot function (4):
W^ i (k) W i [k;A (k)] (10)
At the welfare-maximizing subsidy, this yields the following condition for optimal choice of investment:5
dW^ i
dki
= Nx
i    0 = 0 (11)
where: Nx
i = ^ii + (n  1) ^ij
dkj
dki
Here N denotes the strategic component of the marginal return to investment per unit output, when
subsidies are chosen non-cooperatively to maximize national welfare. By contrast, in the cooperative case,
the supra-national authority in e¤ect chooses all investment levels simultaneously to maximize the sum of
prots. This yields a di¤erent condition for optimal choice of investment by rm i:6
@W^
@ki
= Cx
i    0 = 0 (12)
where: Cx
i = ^ii + (n  1) ^ji
Once again, we use C to denote the strategic component of the marginal return to investment per unit
output, when subsidies are chosen cooperatively to maximize union welfare.
5While the government of country i controls its subsidy si directly, it is convenient to assume that it controls the investment
level of its own rm, ki. The condition for optimal choice of subsidy implies dW^ i=dki = 0 , since the investment levels of other
rms depend on si only indirectly through their dependence on ki.
6The union takes account of the e¤ects of each subsidy on the investment levels of all rms: dW^=dsi =
j(dW^=dk
j)
 
dkj=dsi

= 0. Since dkj=dsi is non-zero in general for all i and j, optimal choice of subsidies implies dW^=dkj = 0
for all j (or, equivalently, dW^=dki = 0 for all i).
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Having derived three expressions for the marginal return to investment, , N and C , corresponding
to each of the three regimes, L, N and C, we can now compare them explicitly. Consider rst the choice
between non-intervention and non-cooperative subsidy setting. Combining the expressions for  and N from
equations (6) and (11), along with the rms rst-order condition (5), we can derive the following expression
for the di¤erence between N and ; which is proportional to the nationally optimal subsidy s
i
N :
7
(N   ) xi = siN = (n  1) ^ij
dkj
dki
(13)
This is a generalization of the two-rm case considered in Leahy and Neary (2001), which draws on a result
for the export subsidy game in Brander (1995). It shows that the sign of the di¤erence between N and
, and hence the sign of the nationally optimal subsidy, depends on the product of two terms. The rst of
these, ^ij , is the cross-e¤ect of one rms investment on anothers prots, and we can say (following Brander)
that it is positive if investment levels are friendly; while the second term, dk
j
dki , is the e¤ect of an increase
in one rms investment on anothers optimal choice of investment. The sign of the latter is given by the
following lemma:8
Lemma 1 An increase in one rms investment raises a rival rms optimal choice of investment if and
only if investment levels are strategic complements.
Proof. To determine the e¤ect of a change in one rms investment ki on a rival rms investment kj , we
rst totally di¤erentiate the rst-order condition for investment by rm j, equation (5), which can be written
compactly as ^jj(k; s
j) = 0. This gives:
^jjdk
j + ^jidk
i + (n  2) ^jhdkh = 0 (14)
Since dkh = dkj and ^jh = ^ji in symmetric equilibrium, this implies:
dkj
dki
=   ^ji
^jj + (n  2) ^ji
(15)
The denominator of this expression must be negative: this is obvious when ^ji is negative, since ^jj must
also be negative from the rms rst-order condition; and when ^ji is positive it is implied by the Seade
necessary condition for stability: ^jj +(n  1) ^ji < 0. (See Seade (1980).) Hence dkj=dki is positive if and
7The subsidy, like N and  themselves, is a function of exogenous variables, and so its value di¤ers depending on the point
at which it is evaluated. We are mainly interested in the sign of the optimal subsidy, which will be invariant provided the terms
^ij and
dkj
dki
have the same sign at di¤erent equilibria.
8Similar results, though under less general assumptions, have been obtained by Dixit (1986) and Henriques (1990).
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only if the numerator is positive, i.e., if and only if investment levels are strategic complements (^ji > 0).
Armed with this lemma, we can conclude that the return to investment in the non-cooperative policy
regime will be higher than in laissez-faire if and only if an increase in investment by one rm has the same
qualitative e¤ect on its rivalsprots in total and at the margin. Formally:
Proposition 1 When consumption is not valued ( = 0), the return to investment in the non-cooperative
policy regime will be higher than in laissez-faire (N > ) if and only if ^
i
j and ^ij have the same sign.
Next, we wish to compare C and . From (6) and (12), it is clear that the di¤erence between them,
which is proportional to the cooperative or multilaterally optimal subsidy sC , depends only on investment
friendliness ^ij :
(C   ) xi = sC = (n  1) ^ij (16)
Formally:
Proposition 2 When consumption is not valued ( = 0), the return to investment in the cooperative policy
regime will be higher than in laissez-faire (C > ) if and only if ^
i
j is positive.
This is so because the only justication for intervention by the union authority is to o¤set the failure of
each individual rm to internalize the e¤ects of its choice of investment on the prots of other rms.
Finally, to compare C and N , we combine equations (11) and (12), along with the rms rst-order con-
dition (5), to derive the following expression, which is proportional to the di¤erence between the cooperative
and non-cooperative subsidies:
(C   N ) xi = sC   siN = (n  1) ^ij

1  dk
j
dki

(17)
The term 1  dkjdki is unambiguously positive from (15) and the Seade stability condition:
1  dk
j
dki
=
^jj + (n  1) ^ji
^jj + (n  2) ^ji
> 0 (18)
This implies that an increase in investment by one rm cannot induce a greater reduction in investment by
a rival rm. It follows from (17) that the criterion for the return to investment in the cooperative regime to
exceed that in the non-cooperative one is the same as that in Proposition 2:
Proposition 3 When consumption is not valued ( = 0), the return to investment in the cooperative policy
regime is higher than in the non-cooperative policy regime (C > N ) if and only if ^
i
j is positive.
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Thus cooperative setting of subsidies leads to higher levels of investment if and only if investment levels
are friendly.
^ij
  (Unfriendly) + (Friendly)
^ij :   (Strategic Substitutes) (i) N >  > C (ii) C >  > N
+ (Strategic Complements) (iii)  > N > C (iv) C > N > 
Table 1: Ranking of Marginal Returns to Investment in Di¤erent Equilibria ( = 0)
The implications of the three bilateral comparisons between marginal returns to investment given in
equations (13), (16) and (17) are summarized in Table 1.9 Whether or not the union o¤ers a higher subsidy
than individual countries depends on the columns in Table 1: the union subsidy will be higher (C > N )
when investment levels are friendly (the second column) and not otherwise. By contrast, whether or not
individual governments provide positive or negative subsidies depends on whether the equilibrium falls in a
diagonal or o¤-diagonal box: they will subsidize (N > ) if the e¤ects of one rms investment on its rivals
protability has the same sign in total as at the margin (i.e., along the diagonal of the table), otherwise they
will tax. Note nally that there is no pattern which depends solely on the rows: whether or not investment
levels are strategic substitutes does not pin down the relative ranking of any pair of marginal returns.
At this level of generality, not much can be said about the likelihood of the four di¤erent outcomes
represented by the four boxes in Table 1. However, as noted in Leahy and Neary (2001) in a two-rm
context, and as will emerge in the examples in Sections 6 and 7, there is a presumption that the outcomes
will fall in one of the diagonal boxes, at least in symmetric cases. Hence, to avoid excessive taxonomy, we
concentrate in what follows on the diagonal boxes, numbered (i) and (iv): the outcomes in o¤-diagonal boxes
can be deduced by analogy.
One qualication which must be made about the conclusions so far is that we have assumed that the
ranking of the marginal returns to investment determines the signs of the optimal subsidies, even though
the di¤erent s are evaluated at di¤erent points. However, as equations (13), (17) and (16) show, this is
not a problem provided the two key criteria, whether or not investments are friendly (the sign of ^ij) and
9 In the two-rm case this table is reminiscent of the "animal spirits" taxonomy of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), though
since the derivatives are those of the reduced-form prot function ^ its interpretation is di¤erent. A better analogy is with the
policy implications of the static export subsidy game of Brander and Spencer (1985): when rmschoice variables are strategic
substitutes and friendly, so N > , the nationally optimal policy is a subsidy; conversely, when rms choice variables are
strategic complements and friendly, so N < , the nationally optimal policy is a tax.
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whether or not they are strategic substitutes (the sign of ^ij), are qualitatively invariant for a given model.
Assuming that these two conditions are the same at the two points to be compared, we can deduce the sign
of the optimal subsidies from the ranking of the s. We can also deduce the rankings of investment and
welfare levels in the three regimes. Comparing symmetric equilibria, investment levels will be higher when
the corresponding  is higher. For welfare, the story is somewhat di¤erent. Given that competition between
rms in the third stage is oligopolistic and that rms outputs are not subsidized, the constrained optimal
outcome for the union is when a cooperative investment subsidy or tax applies. Hence, union welfare, and
by symmetry, national welfare, is maximized in the C regime. Welfare in this regime is always (weakly)
greater than welfare in either of the other two regimes. In the case where the C regime is extremal, bilateral
comparisons between welfare in the other two regimes can be made by invoking Proposition 5 of Leahy and
Neary (1997). Subject to mild regularity conditions set out there and in Proposition 4 below, the ranking
of marginal returns to investment corresponds to the ranking of welfare levels. Hence we can summarize the
implications for welfare comparisons between regimes as follows:
Proposition 4 When consumption is not valued ( = 0): (a) Welfare in the cooperative regime is always
weakly higher than in the other two regimes; and (b) if C is either greater or less than both  and N ,
then, comparing the laissez-faire and non-cooperative regimes, the one with a return to investment closer to
C yields higher welfare, provided for every value of the marginal return to investment in the relevant range
(i.e., between C and whichever of  and N is further from C), the equilibrium is unique and stable (in
the sense of Seade (1980)), with stability referring to both the second- and third-stage games.
Note, however, that when the C regime is not extremal, we cannot rank the levels of welfare in the
laissez-faire and non-cooperative regimes.
These considerations allow us to compare welfare levels between the three regimes in cases where the
cooperative regime is extremal as in cases (i) and (iv) in Table 1. The centre and top panels of Figure 1
illustrate these two cases respectively. In case (i), investment levels are inversely related to welfare across
regimes, with the cooperative regime characterized by an investment tax. By contrast, investment levels are
positively related to welfare across regimes in case (iv), with a higher subsidy mandated in the cooperative
than in the noncooperative regime. Cases (ii) and (iii) are not illustrated but can easily be deduced, while
case (v) can only arise when policy-makers take account of consumer welfare in setting their subsidies, the
scenario to which we turn in the next section.
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5 Optimal Policy when Consumption is Valued
When some of the output is consumed within the bloc of countries and government policy respects consumer
preferences, the previous derivations are altered in one key respect: whereas before friendlinesswas dened
with respect to the e¤ects of one rms investment on the prots of another, it must now be redened in
terms of its e¤ects on the welfare of another country. Di¤erentiating the welfare function (8) yields:
W^ ij = ^
i
j + B^
i
j (19)
Clearly, prot-friendliness (^ij > 0) contributes to welfare-friendliness (W^
i
j > 0), and the two criteria coincide
in the export-only case ( = 0). However, we must also take account of what we can call consumer-
friendliness, i.e., whether the derivative B^ij is positive or not.
We can be sure that investment is consumer-friendly, so B^ij is positive, in one important special case,
where investment does not a¤ect preferences directly, so consumers are a¤ected only indirectly via its e¤ects
on prices. In that case the benet function for country i takes the standard consumer surplus form:
Bi = ui
 
yi
  hphyhi (20)
where yhi denotes the amount of country hs output consumed in country i. Di¤erentiating with respect to
the investment of country j yields:
B^ij 
@B^i
@kj
=  
X
h
yhi
dph
dkj
=  x
n
X
h
dph
dkj
(21)
where we have imposed utility maximization (uih = p
h) and symmetry (yhi = x=n) to simplify. For a wide
variety of models, investment lowers prices, and so, since consumers benet from lower prices, the derivative
of country is consumer surplus with respect to the level of investment in country j is positive. Note that,
with symmetry, it is also independent of the country in which the investment occurs: B^ij = B^
i
i > 0 for all j.
For convenience we concentrate in the remainder of the text on this case, though the algebra is consistent
with cases where investment a¤ects utility directly and possibly with a negative sign.
To see the implications of this change in specication we once again need to compare the marginal
returns to investment in the three regimes. That in the laissez-faire regime, , arises from rm behaviour
only. Hence it does not depend on consumer surplus and so its sign depends only on prot-friendliness as
before. However, the signs of the other two depend on welfare-friendliness. In the noncooperative case the
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marginal return to investment per unit output is now dened implicitly by the following:
Nx
i = W^ ii + (n  1) W^ ij
dkj
dki
(22)
while in the cooperative case it is dened by:
Cx
i = W^ ii + (n  1) W^ ji (23)
Recalling (11) and (12), these di¤er from the case where  is zero only in replacing prot derivatives with
the corresponding welfare derivatives.
As before, it is the comparisons between these marginal returns which matter for the relative rankings of
subsidy levels and welfare. Consider rst the di¤erence between the marginal returns in the non-cooperative
regime and in laissez-faire. This now becomes:
(N   ) xi = B^ii + (n  1) W^ ij
dkj
dki
(24)
This can also be written as:
(N   ) xi = B^ii
dK
dki
+ (n  1) ^ij
dkj
dki
(25)
The rst term is unambiguously positive, implying that a rise in one rms investment cannot lower industry
investment:
dK
dki
= 1 + (n  1) dk
j
dki
=
^jj   ^ji
^jj + (n  2) ^ji
> 0 (26)
Both the numerator and denominator of this expression are negative under plausible restrictions: the former
is the Hahn stability condition, while the latter as we have seen is implied by the Seade stability condition
jj + (n  1)ji < 0. As for the second term in (25), it is identical to that considered in the last section.
(See equation (13).) Summarizing:
Proposition 5 When consumption is valued ( > 0), a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for the return
to investment in the non-cooperative policy regime to be higher than in laissez-faire (N > ) is that ^
i
j and
^ij have the same sign.
Hence (recalling Proposition 1) we can conclude that the return to investment in the non-cooperative
policy regime is more likely to exceed that in laissez-faire when consumption is valued than when it is not,
since national-welfare-maximizing governments are more likely to o¤er a subsidy even if rms over-invest for
strategic reasons.
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Next, the comparison between C and  is more complex than in the last section. It is given by:
(C   ) xi = B^ii + (n  1) W^ ij (27)
Now welfare-friendliness is su¢ cient for C to be greater than , but it is not necessary. This condition can
be strengthened by making use of the symmetry of the consumer-friendliness term (so B^ij = B^
i
i) to rewrite
(27) as follows, :
(C   ) xi = (n  1) ^ij + nB^ii (28)
This shows that prot-friendliness is su¢ cient for a positive subsidy by the union, but even if investments
are prot-unfriendly a subsidy may still be justied by a su¢ ciently high degree of consumer-friendliness.
Summarizing:
Proposition 6 When consumption is valued ( > 0), a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for the return
to investment in the cooperative policy regime to exceed that in laissez-faire (C > ) is that ^
i
j is positive.
Finally, compare C and N . The di¤erence between them can be written as follows:
(C   N ) xi = (n  1) W^ ij

1  dk
j
dki

(29)
The expression in parentheses is positive as we saw in the last section. (See equation (18).) Hence the sign of
the right-hand side depends only on welfare-friendliness: cooperation mandates higher levels of investment
if and only if each countrys welfare is enhanced by higher investment in other countries.
Proposition 7 When consumption is valued ( > 0), the return to investment in the cooperative policy
regime is higher than in the non-cooperative policy regime (C > N ) if and only if W^
i
j is positive.
Comparing Proposition 3, we can see that attaching a weight to consumption leads to welfare-friendliness
taking over the role played by prot-friendliness in the prot-shifting case.
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W^ ij
  (Unfriendly) + (Friendly)
^ij :   (Strategic Substitutes)
(i) N >  > C
(v) N > C > 
(ii) C >  > N
(iv) C > N > 
+ (Strategic Complements)
(i) N >  > C
(iii)  > N > C
(v) N > C > 
(iv) C > N > 
Table 2: Ranking of Marginal Returns to Investment in Di¤erent Equilibria ( > 0)
The implications of these comparisons are summarized in Table 2, where the columns reect whether
investments are welfare-friendly or unfriendly. The range of possibilities is greater than in the case of
 = 0 considered in the previous section. (Compare Table 1.) Now it matters whether investment levels
are friendly from the perspective of welfare as well as from that of prots. We have assumed that they
are always consumer-friendly, so if investment levels are prot-friendly they must also be welfare-friendly.
However, if they are prot-unfriendly they can be either welfare-friendly or unfriendly. Hence there are more
possibilities in the o¤-diagonal cells of the table. In addition, a fth regime is possible when investments
are welfare-unfriendly: national governments may over-subsidize from the unions point of view even though
the laissez-faire regime implies under-subsidization.10 This case is illustrated in the nal panel of Figure 1,
where we continue to concentrate on the cases in the diagonal cells of the table.
Finally, these comparisons between the marginal cost of investment in the di¤erent regimes translate into
comparisons between welfare subject to the same qualications as in Proposition 4 in the last section.
6 The Linear-Quadratic Cournot Case
So far we have presented our results in terms of a very general view of the two types of investment links
between rms: whether higher investment by one rm raises rival rmsprots or rival countrieswelfare in
total (friendliness) and at the margin (strategic substitutability). To show how these concepts can be applied,
it is helpful to look more closely at some important special cases which also allow us to derive closed-form
solutions and to calculate explicitly the marginal return to investment under di¤erent assumptions about
policy setting. In this section we consider the case of investment in cost-reducing R&D followed by Cournot
10The remaining possibility, case (vi), with  > C > N , cannot arise when investment is consumer-friendly, i.e., when B^
i
j
is positive.
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competition with di¤erentiated products, under the assumptions of linear demand and quadratic costs of
investment.
Under these assumptions the specication of technology and demands is as follows. The R&D cost
function is  
 
ki

= 12
 
ki
2
, where  is a positive constant, so  0
 
ki

= ki. As for marginal production
costs, they fall linearly in R&D:
ci = c0    f(1  ) ki + Kg ; 0    1; (30)
where K  iki is industry R&D, c0 and  are positive constants, and  denotes the spillover coe¢ cient
which is also constant. Hence the marginal production cost of any rm depends inversely on a weighted
average of its own investment and of aggregate industry investment, where the weights depend on . As for
the inverse demand curve facing rm i, it is linear in outputs:
pi = a  b f(1  e)xi + eXg ; 0  e  1. (31)
Here a, b and e are positive constants, with e an inverse measure of product di¤erentiation, and X  ixi
is industry output. This demand function implies that the price which consumers are willing to pay for any
good depends inversely on a weighted average of its own output and of the output of all goods, where the
weights depend on e.
The rst-order condition for output in the nal stage of the game is:
@i
@xi
= pi   ci   bxi = a  b f(2  e)xi + eXg   ci = 0 (32)
Summing over i, we can solve for industry output and then substitute back into (32) to solve for rm output:
X =
na  cj
bE
xi =
E
 
a  ci  e  na  cj
b (2  e)E (33)
where E  2 + (n  1) e > 0. Equation (30) gives an explicit expression for ci, which also implies that cj
equals nc0   OK, where O  1 + (n  1) is the marginal social return to R&D. Substituting for these
into (33), the levels of industry and rm output can be written as functions of the levels of industry and
rm R&D:
X =
1
bE
[n (a  c0) + OK] (34)
xi =
1
b (2  e)

2  e
E
(a  c0) + (1  ) ki + 2   e
E
K

(35)
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The coe¢ cient of K in (35) gives the cross-e¤ect of one rms investment in R&D on anothers output:
@xi
@kj
=
2   e
b (2  e)E (36)
Thus R&D reduces rival output for zero or low spillovers (i.e.,  < e2 ), but increases it if spillovers are large
and/or product di¤erentiation is low (i.e.,  > e2 ). As for the own-e¤ect of investment on output, it is given
by the sum of the coe¢ cients of ki and K, and is always positive:
@xi
@ki
=
(1  )E + 2   e
b (2  e)E  =

1 +
(n  1) e
(2  e)E (e  2)


2b
> 0 (37)
We now have all the building blocks we need to derive the criteria for prot friendliness and strategic
substitutability in this model. Note rst from (32) that prots (in the absence of subsidies) can be written
as:
i = (pi   ci)xi     ki2 =2 = b  xi2     ki2 =2 (38)
Hence the criterion for prot friendliness is the same as that for R&D to raise rival output from (36):
^ij = 2bx
i @x
i
@kj
= 2
2   e
(2  e)Ex
i (39)
Similarly, using (37), the private marginal return to R&D is given by:
^ii = 2bx
i @x
i
@ki
= xi where:  = 1 +
(n  1) e
(2  e)E (e  2) (40)
This shows that rms have an incentive to over-invest relative to the non-strategic benchmark (i.e.,  > 1)
only when  is less than e2 . Finally, di¤erentiating (40) with respect to k
j gives the criterion for strategic
substitutability:
^ij = 
@xi
@kj
= 
2   e
(2  e)E (41)
where   2=b is a measure of the relative e¤ectiveness of R&D. Once again, we see that the sign of this
depends solely on 2   e. Hence, just as in the two-rm case of Leahy and Neary (2001), the criteria for
strategic complementarity and prot friendliness are identical: both require that  exceed e2 .
We can now fully characterize the possible outcomes in the case where consumption is not valued ( = 0).
Because the criteria for strategic complementarity and prot friendliness coincide, only the diagonal cells
in Table 1 apply, so the only possible cases are (i) and (iv).11 Moreover, from (13), national governments
11There is also a borderline case where all three equilibria coincide, when  and e
2
are equal. To avoid tedious repetition we
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always o¤er positive subsidies to R&D: the return to R&D in the national optimum, N , is always greater
than that in free trade, . Which of these two cases is closer to the global optimum for the union depends on
whether investments are friendly (or, equivalently, whether they are strategic complements). Case (i) applies
when investments are unfriendly, which in this model implies that either spillovers are low or competition
is intense because products are relatively undi¤erentiated (so  is less than e2 ). It is illustrated in panel (i)
of Figure 1. In this case the national optimum leads to over-subsidization. A commitment to laissez-faire
would be superior to this, though still leading to more investment than the global optimum. By contrast,
case (iv) applies when investments are friendly, either because spillovers are high or because products are
relatively more di¤erentiated and so competition is less intense ( is greater than e2 ), and it is illustrated in
panel (iv) of Figure 1. Now laissez-faire is the worst outcome. Non-cooperative subsidy-setting by national
governments yields higher R&D and welfare, though less than the globally optimal levels.
The two regimes are illustrated from a di¤erent perspective in Figure 2, drawn in the space of  and e.
When consumption is not valued, the dashed locus  = e2 divides the space into two regions corresponding
to cases (iv) and (i) (above and below the locus respectively).
When consumption is valued, the discussion so far must be augmented by taking account of whether
investment is consumer-friendly, and (in conjunction with prots) welfare-friendly. Given our linear demand
specication, the general expression for consumer-friendliness in (21) becomes:
B^ij = B^
i
i =  
x
n
X
h
dph
dki
=  x
n
dP
dki
(42)
where we use P to denote the sum of prices: P  jpj = na   b f1 + (n  1) egX = na   b (E   1)X.
Di¤erentiating this with respect to ki and using equation (34) to eliminate the e¤ect of one rms investment
on industry output yields:
B^ii =  
x
n
dP
dki
=
x
n
b (E   1) dX
dki
=
x
n
(E   1) O
E
(43)
So, investment is always consumer-friendly in this model.
Consider now the implications of the value of B^ii for the ranking of the di¤erent marginal returns to R&D.
From (25) it is clear that N always exceeds : as already noted, the fact that consumption is consumer-
friendly gives an additional motive for national governments to subsidize R&D, and this reinforces the fact
that the "prot-shifting" motive always mandates a positive subsidy in the linear-quadratic Cournot case.
Hence only regimes (i), (iv) and (v) in Table 2 can prevail in this case. It is also clear from (29) that C
ignore such borderline cases in the text: their properties can easily be deduced by combining those of their two neighbouring
regimes.
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exceeds N if and only if investments are welfare-friendly. Substituting from (39) and (43) for prot- and
consumer-friendliness respectively, the condition for welfare-friendliness becomes:
W^ ij = ^
i
j + B^
i
j =
1
E

2
2  e (2   e) +  (E   1)O
1
n

x (44)
Eliminating 0, the threshold value of  for investment to be welfare-friendly and hence for C to exceed
N becomes:
C > N ,  >
e   (E   1) 2 e2 1n
2 +  (E   1) 2 e2 n 1n
(45)
Clearly the threshold value of  reduces to e2 when consumption is not valued ( = 0), and it is decreasing in
. In the relevant range,  2 (0; 1] and e 2 [0; 1], the threshold is increasing in e, it is negative for low e, rising
from   2n+(n 1) when e equals zero to attain its maximum value (given ) of 2 4+(n 1) when e equals one.
It is illustrated by the solid boundary between regimes (iv) and (v) in Figure 2 for the special case of  = 1,
when the end-points simplify to   13n 1 at e = 0 and 1n+3 at e = 1. Hence we can conclude that national
governments over-subsidize only for relatively low spillovers or relatively high degrees of competition (in the
sense of high values of e).
Unlike the case where consumption is not valued, a coincidence between the two subsidy regimes does not
imply that they coincide with laissez-faire, so there is a non-empty region (v) where national governments
over-subsidize (C < N ) but laissez-faire yields too little R&D (C > ). The boundary between this region
and region (i) corresponds to the threshold value of  which equates C and . From (27), the di¤erence
between C and  depends on (n  1) ^ij + nB^ii , which, again substituting from (39) and (43), becomes:
(n  1) ^ij + nB^ii =
1
E

2
2  e (n  1) (2   e) +  (E   1)O

x (46)
Eliminating 0 once again, the threshold value of  for C to exceed  becomes:
C >  ,  >
e   (E   1) 2 e2 1n 1
2 +  (E   1) 2 e2
(47)
It is clear by inspection that this is qualitatively similar to (45), the threshold value of  which equates the
marginal returns to R&D in the national and cooperative regimes. It also reduces to e2 when consumption is
not valued ( = 0), it is decreasing in  and increasing in e. Furthermore, it is always lower than the threshold
value in (45). This can be seen by comparing the general expressions (29) and (27): the former shows that
national governments and the union as a whole have identical incentives to intervene when investment is
welfare-neutral, W^ ij is zero; but the latter shows that in this case the union still has a motive to provide
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a positive subsidy provided investment is strictly consumer friendly, B^ij > 0. The implications of this are
shown in Figure 2, where the threshold in (47) is illustrated by the solid boundary between regimes (v)
and (i) for the special case of  = 1, when the end-points simplify to   13(n 1) at e = 0 and n 2(n 1)(n+4) at
e = 1.12 Clearly the emergence of regime (v) almost completely eliminates regime (i) relative to the case
where  is zero (when it prevails in the whole of the area below the dashed line  = e2 ). Only when goods
are near-perfect substitutes, so competition is very intense, and spillovers are close to zero, is it optimal for
the union to tax R&D, even though individual governments have an incentive to subsidize it.
7 The Linear-Quadratic Bertrand Case
The second special case we consider in more detail retains the cost assumptions of the previous section but
assumes that rms compete by setting prices rather than quantities. It is now more convenient to write the
demand functions in direct rather than inverse form:
xi =   (1 + ") pi   "P	 (48)
where P  jpj denotes the sum of all prices as in the last section. It is clear by inspection that the
substitution parameter " must be less than 1n 1 in a symmetric equilibrium. We can go further if we assume
that the direct demands in (48) are derived from the same individual utility function as the inverse demands
(31) in the previous section: it then follows that " is directly related to the primitive substitution parameter
e : "  e1+(n 2)e .13
We can now proceed in a similar series of steps to those in the previous section. The rst-order condition
for price in the nal stage of the game is:
@i
@pi
= xi     pi   ci =    f(2 + ") pi   "Pg+ ci = 0 (49)
Summing over i, we can solve for the sum of prices and then substitute back to solve for individual prices:
P =
n+ cj
E0
pi =
+ 
 
ci + "P

 (2 + ")
(50)
12For e =  = 1, the threshold value of  rises from zero at n = 2 to a maximum of 1
12
or 0.0833 at n = 4 and 5, and then
falls.
13See Neary (2002) for a full demonstration. The underlying utility function is quadratic, and the parameters  and  are
also related to the primitive parameters a, b and e. We rule out the case where e equals one, since the inverse demand functions
cannot be inverted when goods are perfect substitutes. This also serves to avoid the case where no equilibrium in pure strategies
exists.
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where E0  2  (n  1) " > 0. Combining with the demand function we can then solve for rm output:
xi =
+ "P   (1 + ")ci
2 + "
(51)
Di¤erentiating this we can calculate the crucial cross-e¤ect of one rms R&D on a rival rms output:
@xi
@kj
=

2 + "

"
@P
@kj
  (1 + ") @c
i
@kj

=

(2 + ")E0
[(1 + ")E0   "0] (52)
Substituting for 0  1 + (n  1), the condition for this to be positive is:
@xi
@kj
> 0 ,  > "
(1 + ")E0   (n  1) " (53)
This is easier to relate to the results of the last section when we reexpress " in terms of the primitive
substitution parameter e:
@xi
@kj
> 0 ,  > f1 + (n  2)eg e
2 + 2(n  2)e  (n  1)e2 (54)
The importance of this expression is that, just as in the last section, it is also the criterion for investments to
be both prot-friendly and strategic complements. This can be seen immediately by di¤erentiating operating
prots ^ which equal  1
 
xi
2
:
^ij = 2
xi

@xi
@kj
and ^ij =
@^ij
@ki
=
2

@xi
@kj
@xi
@ki
(55)
To prove the required result it only remains to show that @xi=@ki is positive. Di¤erentiating the expression
for xi with respect to ki:
@xi
@ki
=

2 + "

"
@P
@ki
  (1 + ") @c
i
@ki

=

(2 + ")E0
[(1 + ")E0   "0] (56)
Now rewrite the nal term in square brackets using 0  1 + (n  1) = n  (n  1) (1  ):
(1 + ")E0   "0 = (2 + ") [1  (n  1)"] + " (n  1) (1  ) (57)
The rst term on the right-hand side is strictly positive, and so the same must be true of @xi=@ki. Hence we
can conclude that the criteria for prot-friendliness and strategic complementarity coincide, just as in the
Cournot case of Section 6.
This threshold value of  for prot-friendliness and strategic complementarity is illustrated in Figure 3 for
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the cases of n equal to 2 and 15. The results for the Bertrand export-only case di¤er quantitatively from those
for the Cournot case of the last section, where the threshold value for  was simply e2 .
14 Notwithstanding
the fact that rms actions (i.e., prices) are now strategic complements, the range of parameters for which
R&D levels are strategic complements is smaller. Another di¤erence is that the number of rms now a¤ects
the threshold, unlike in the Cournot case, though not at the end-points (the threshold equals zero at e = 0
and one at e = 1, for all values of n), and, in practice, the e¤ect of changes in the number of rms is small
as the gure shows. Overall, the conclusions are qualitatively identical to the Cournot case. As before, the
threshold  is increasing in e and only the diagonal entries in Table 1 apply. Low values of  and high values
of e imply that R&D levels are unfriendly and strategic substitutes, and therefore that regime (i) obtains:
non-cooperation leads to excessive investment, and banning subsidies would improve welfare. Conversely,
high values of  imply that regime (iv) obtains: non-cooperative subsidy-setting leads to too little investment
and reduces welfare below the (constrained) welfare-maximizing level, but banning subsidies would be even
worse. Finally, these results can be extended to take account of consumption being valued ( > 0), but as
in the previous section this serves mainly to expand the range of parameter values corresponding to regime
(iv).
8 Conclusion
This paper has considered the rationale for multilateral agreements to limit investment subsidies. We pre-
sented a general multi-rm model of investment competition between oligopolistic rms, and provided a
welfare ranking for di¤erent symmetric international industrial policy games.
Our general model identies three key factors which inuence the desirability of national assistance to
investment. Two of these relate to the e¤ects of one rms investment on its rivalsprots: does it raise rivals
prots in total, so investment levels are "friendly"?; and does it raise them at the margin, so investment levels
are "strategic complements"? The third factor is the importance which policy makers attach to domestic
consumption of the subsidized industrys products.
In the benchmark case when consumption is not valued, the range of outcomes is fairly restricted, and
reects the insights from the literature on strategic trade policy, though here extended to a more general
context. If investments are unfriendly and strategic substitutes, our results show that national-welfare max-
imizing governments will over-subsidize investment for rent-shifting reasons. Hence an enforced ban on
subsidies would improve welfare, though optimal intervention would require taxing it to curb the tendency
14The di¤erences between the two can be seen more clearly by rewriting the threshold value of  in (54) as e
h
2  (n 1)e2
1+(n 2)e
i 1
,
showing that it equals e
2
except for the nal term in the denominator,  (n  1)e2.
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of rms to over-invest for strategic reasons. By contrast, when investments are friendly and strategic com-
plements, national governments do not subsidize enough from the point of view of union welfare, although
intervention is better than nothing, in that welfare is higher than with non-intervention.
When the industrys output is partly or wholly consumed within the union, and policy makers respect
consumer preferences, the range of outcomes is greater, but there is a stronger presumption that subsidies
are socially desirable. Even if investments are prot-unfriendly, so one rms investment reduces its rivals
incentives to invest, it may still be welfare-improving to subsidize it if it is su¢ ciently consumer-friendly. In
this case the investment subsidy serves as a proxy for an output subsidy which would o¤set the oligopoly
distortion and raise consumption towards the socially desirable level.
We also considered in more detail the special case of R&D competition followed by either Cournot
or Bertrand competition with linear-quadratic functional forms. Here the general criteria of investment
friendliness and strategic substitutability turn out to hinge on the magnitude of R&D spillovers and on
the intensity of competition between rms, as measured by the degree of product substitutability. Low
spillovers and/or more intense competition because products are very close substitutes imply that R&D levels
are unfriendly and strategic substitutes. In that case, non-cooperation leads to excessive investment, and
banning subsidies would improve welfare. Conversely, high spillovers and/or less intense competition because
products are relatively more di¤erentiated imply that R&D levels are friendly and strategic complements.
In that case non-cooperative subsidy-setting leads to too little investment and reduces welfare below the
(constrained) welfare-maximizing level, but banning subsidies would be even worse. A feature of these
ndings is that the Cournot and Bertrand cases yield qualitatively identical results, especially when we
interpret the substitution parameter correctly.
Our results can be used to assess the benets of multilateral agreements to limit national aid to rms in
an imperfectly competitive setting. The model can also be applied to the issue of state assistance to industry
in a federal setting. As we have noted, for example, the European Commission, though it is opposed to
national state aid to rms in general, tends to take a much more lenient view of R&D subsidies than it does
of production subsidies. Our model allows us to assess the economic rationale for this.
22
References
Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger (1994): The sensitivity of strategic and corrective R&D policy in
oligopolistic industries,Journal of International Economics, 36, 133-150.
Besley, Tim and Paul Seabright (1999): The e¤ects and policy implications of state aids to industry:
An economic analysis,Economic Policy, 28, 14-53.
Brander, James A. (1995): Strategic trade policy, in G. Grossman and K. Rogo¤ (eds.): Handbook of
International Economics, Vol. 3, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1395-1455.
Brander, James A. and Barbara J. Spencer (1985): Export subsidies and international market share
rivalry,Journal of International Economics, 18, 83-100.
Collie, David R. (2000): State aid in the European union: the prohibition of subsidies in an integrated
marketInternational Journal of Industrial Organisation, 18, 867-884.
Collie, David R. (2002): Prohibiting state aid in an integrated market: Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies
with di¤erentiated products,Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 2, 215-231.
Collie, David R. (2005): State aid to investment and R&D,European Economy Economic Papers, No.
231, European Commission, Brussels.
Commission of the European Communities (2005): State Aid Action Plan: Less and Better Targeted State
Aid: A Roadmap for State Aid Reform 2005-2009, Brussels.
Dixit, Avinash (1986): Comparative statics for oligopoly,International Economic Review, 27, 107-122.
Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole (1984): The fat-cat e¤ect, the puppy-dog ploy, and the lean and
hungry look,American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 74, 361-366.
Haaland, Jan I. and Hans Jarle Kind (2006): Cooperative and non-cooperative R&D policy in an
economic union,Review of World Economics, 142:4, 720-745.
Haaland, Jan I. and Hans Jarle Kind (2007): R&D policies, trade and process innovation,Journal of
International Economics, forthcoming.
Henriques, Irene (1990): Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers: Comment,
American Economic Review, 80, 638-640.
Kreps, David M. and José A. Scheinkman (1983): Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition
yield Cournot outcomes,Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 326-337.
Leahy, Dermot and J. Peter Neary (1997): Public policy towards R&D in oligopolistic industries,
American Economic Review, 87, 642-662.
Leahy, Dermot and J. Peter Neary (2001): Robust rules for industrial policy in open economies,Journal
of International Trade and Economic Development, 10, 393-409.
23
Leahy, Dermot and J. Peter Neary (2005): Symmetric research joint ventures: Cooperative substitutes
and complements,International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23, 381-397.
Maggi, Giovanni (1996): Strategic trade policies with endogenous mode of competition, American
Economic Review, 86, 237-258.
Neary, J. Peter (2002): Foreign competition and wage inequality,Review of International Economics,
10, 680-693.
Neary, J. Peter and Dermot Leahy (2000): Strategic trade and industrial policy towards dynamic
oligopolies,Economic Journal, 110, 484-508.
Seade, Jesús (1980): The stability of Cournot revisited,Journal of Economic Theory, 23, 15-27.
Spencer, Barbara J. and James A. Brander (1983): International R&D rivalry and industrial strategy,
Review of Economic Studies, 50, 707-722.
24
Wk
..
.L
N
C
(iv)
Figure 1: Alternative Welfare Configurations
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Figure 2: Ranking of Marginal Returns to R&D
in Cournot Competition, n=3
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Figure 3: Ranking of Marginal Returns to R&D
in Bertrand Competition, n=2 and 15
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